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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PROPERTY
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
COMMON, PUBLIC, AND PRIVATE THINGS
According to well-settled Louisiana legislation, jurisprudence,
and doctrine, the beds or bottoms of navigable waterbodies are
insusceptible of private ownership and necessarily belong to the
state.' When lands are formed along the shores of navigable water-
bodies as a result of alluvion, 2 or when lands are exposed as a result
of dereliction,3 question arises as to the ownership of these lands. In
this respect, Louisiana law draws a distinction between navigable
rivers, navigable lakes, and the sea. Alluvion and dereliction along
the shores of navigable rivers belong to the riparian owners4 whereas
alluvion and dereliction along the shores of navigable lakes and of
the sea belong to the state.' Quite frequently, therefore, it is im-
portant to determine whether a particular body of water is a river
or an inland lake. This question was raised in State v. Placid Oil
Co.' The significance and implications of this most important deci-
sion were discussed previously in this Review.' This writer's personal
involvement with the case precludes further comments.
The question whether the repose statute of 1912 cures all patents,
including those that were absolute nullities at the time they were
issued, was raised in two decisions. In Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v.
Delacroix Corp.' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal found that the
bodies of water in question were non-navigable at the time of their
transfer to private interests; hence, the patents conveying them were
valid or cured by the repose statute. The opinion deserves attention
because it contains an enlightened discussion of tests of navigability
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 453, 482; A. YIANNOPOULOUS, PROPERTY § 32 in 2 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 90 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL LAW PROPERTY].
2. Alluvion is defined as "the accretions, which are formed successively and im-
perceptibly to any soil situated on the shore of'a river or other stream." LA. Civ. CODE
art. 509.
3. Dereliction is defined as the process whereby lands are "formed by running
water retiring imperceptibly from one of its shores .... Id. art. 510.
4. Id. arts. 509, 510.
5. As to sea, see id. art. 510; Bruning v. New Orleans, 165 La. 511, 115 So. 733
(1928). As to lakes, see State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 20 So. 2d 136 (1944). But cf.
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973) (accretions and derelictions along
navigable waterbodies subject to the equal footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands
Act; a federal question governed by federal law).
6. 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974).
7. See Note, 35 LA. L. REV. 199 (1974).
8. 285 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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and an interpretation of the "oyster" statutes' in the light of their
purpose. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board," the same court
held that patents conveying navigable water bottoms contrary to
oyster statutes in force at the time of their issuance were absolute
nullities and that, as such, they could not be cured by the repose
statute of 1912. The Louisiana supreme court granted certiorari," and
the question before the court seems to be the viability of California
Co. v. Price2 or at least its restriction to pre-1887 patents. 3
MOVABLES AND IMMOVABLES
It is settled law that standing crops are susceptible of separate
ownership, namely, that they may belong to a person other than the
owner of the ground as movables by anticipation. 4 It is equally well
settled that a predial lessee owns the crops that he grows and that, if
his lease is recorded, he may assert his ownership against third per-
sons. A tortfeasor causing damage to the standing crops of a lessee
is not a person entitled to rely on the public records; hence, there
should be no doubt that an unrecorded predial lessee may assert his
ownership against the wrongdoer and claim damages for the destruc-
tion of his crops. In Hargroder v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.,'"
Chief Justice Sanders declared that the predial lessee's recovery was
based on a theory of stipulation pour autrui. Four Justices concurred
in the result, two writing separate opinions and basing recovery on
article 2315 of the Civil Code. 7
LEGAL SERVITUDES
Articles 667-669: Actions for Damages
According to well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence, the violation
9. For an analysis of the "oyster" statutes, see CIVI LAw PROPERTY § 32.
10. 291 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
11. 294 So. 2d 831 (La. 1974).
12. 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954).
13. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term -
Property, 31 LA. L. REV. 196, 198-99 (1971).
14. See Yiannopoulos, Standing Crops, Movables or Immovables?, 17 LOVOLA L.
REV. 323, 325 (1971).
15. See Flower & King v. S.S. Pearce & Son, 45 La. Ann. 853, 13 So. 150 (1893);
Lewis v. Klotz, 39 La. Ann. 259, 1 So. 539 (1887); Porche v. Bodin, 28 La. Ann. 761
(1876).
16. 290 So. 2d 874 (La. 1974).
17. Id. at 877 (Barham, J., concurring); Id. at 878 (Tate, J., concurring). For this
writer's views, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term
- Property, 34 LA. L. REV. 207, 209-13 (1973).
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of the obligations of 'vicinage, imposed by articles 667 and 669 of the
Civil Code, gives rise to civil responsibility without negligence.'
Questions concerning the foundation, nature, and extent of this re-
sponsibility were raised in Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of
New Orleans, 9 in which the Louisiana supreme court awarded dam-
ages to landowners for injuries to their properties resulting from con-
struction works on a city street. Justice Summer's scholarly opinion
has been discussed elsewhere.' For present purposes it suffices to
state that the Lombard decision deserves attention because it im-
poses on a contractor responsibility without negligence under article
667 solidarily with a public body as owner of the city street.2 '
According to Louisiana decisions, diminution of land values,
though unquestionably caused by acts, constructions, or activities on
neighboring property, does not support an award for damages under
article 669 in the absence of allegations and proof of physical invasion
of property by excessive emissions."2 In Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco,
Inc.,"2 plaintiff claimed damages for the depreciation of his property
resulting from the construction of a gas pipeline on neighboring prop-
erty. Plaintiff alleged neither negligence in the construction or opera-
tion of the pipeline nor physical discomfort or damage caused by
excessive emissions, facts that would have supported liability under
article 669 corresponding with liability for "nuisance" in common law
jurisdictions. The court did not dispute the fact that the value of
plaintiff's property had depreciated, but sustained defendant's ex-
ception of no cause of action in accordance with the implications of
a long series of Louisiana decisions. In Peevy v. Town of Jonesboro,4
the court avoided the issue whether damages for depreciation of
property are recoverable under article 669 of the Civil Code by a
finding that the discomfort suffered by neighboring landowners was
of a temporary nature.
Articles 667-669: Action of Injunctive Relief
Article 667 of the Civil Code as well as article 669 sustains actions
18. See Yiannopoulos, Violations of the Obligations of Vicinage: Remedies under
Articles 667 and 669, 34 LA. L. REv. 475, 479 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Violations of
Vicinage].
19. 284 So. 2d 905 (La. 1973).
20. See Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage: Articles
*667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REv. 195, 233 (1974).
21. Id. at 234.
22. For detailed discussion, see Violations of Vicinage at 513.
23. 296 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) cert. granted, 301 So. 2d 44 (1974).
24. 286 So. 2d 378 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
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for injunctive relief. 5 Injunctive relief under article 667 is available
to a landowner when a neighboring landowner abuses his ownership
by undertaking acts, works, or activities that cause damage or are
expected with a degree of certainty to cause damage. Injunctive relief
under article 669, however, is available to any person of normal sensi-
bilities who suffers excessive physical discomfort on account of acts,
works, or activities on neighboring property that constitute an excep-
tional use of property or a use that is unreasonable under the circum-
stances.
In Salter v. B. W.S. Corp., 6 an action was brought by a neighbor-
ing landowner and a predial lessee to enjoin defendants from dispos-
ing of chemical waste on their own property. The trial court issued
an injunction prohibiting the defendants from "disposing of any acid
and/or chemicals on their property," and the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal affirmed. 7 The Louisiana supreme court found that the ad-
joining landowner had no ground to complain because he had failed
to prove that operations on defendant's property would damage his
property. Turning then to lessee's claim for injunctive relief, the court
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to issue a
"qualified injunction," namely, one enjoining the defendant "to con-
duct its operations in compliance with standards recommended by its
experts which will prohibit the escape of noxious substances on the
property of its neighbors.""
There is nothing extraordinary in this narrow holding: the state-
ment of facts substantiates the conclusion that the interests of the
lessee were threatened with irreparable harm. Accordingly, injunc-
tive relief was entirely appropriate under article 3601 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which is applicable to anyone. In a majority opinion,
however, Justice Dixon sought to support the decree of the court on
the basis of article 667 of the Civil Code and to suggest a number of
ideas that deserve comment. Justice Barham, with whom Justice
Tate joined, filed a scholarly and eloquent concurring opinion.
According to the majority opinion, a predial lessee has a right to
seek injunctive relief under article 667. This might be a plausible
idea, but the only authorities cited for the proposition are two cases
involving claims under article 669, namely, injunctive relief on ac-
count of insufferable inconveniences caused by emissions, and one
case involving an action for damages. 9 Further, the majority opinion
25. For detailed discussion, see Violations of Vicinage at 482, 515.
26. 290 So. 2d 821 (La. 1974).
27. 281 So. 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
28. 290 So. 2d 821, 825 (La. 1974).
29. See Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385 (1971) (stable);
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declares that "the availability of injunctive relief in an action predi-
cated on C.C. 667 is controlled by C.C.P. 3601. C.C. 667 does not
specifically provide for injunctive relief; thus, an injunction is only
available under this article upon showing of irreparable injury."3
Characteristically, no authorities are cited for this statement which,
in effect, limits the applicability of article 667 to actions for damages
only. Indeed, why should one complicate his case by invoking article
667 if one can prove the threat of irreparable harm under article 3601
of the Code of Civil Procedure? But the Civil Law has historically
granted injunctive relief to a landowner in case of actual or threat-
ened unlawful interference with his ownership;' and it would be
anachronistic to assert that this relief is subject to the limitations of
equity jurisprudence, including the notion of "irreparable harm" that
article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure has adopted. Injunctive
relief under article 667 of the Civil Code is a matter of right and quite
independent of any other article of the Civil Code or of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The duties that article 667 imposes are likened to
servitudes, and, as servitudes, are enforceable by injunction upon a
showing of actual or impending damage or deprivation of enjoyment,
resulting from an abusive exercise of the right of ownership by a
neighbor.2 Recent decisions correctly point out that injunctive relief
in this field of property law is available without the historical limita-
tions of equity jurisprudence"3 and that in an action for injunction
under article 667 it is not necessary to plead and prove irreparable
injury.3 4
Enclosed Estates
In Patin v. Richard,3" by a common act of sale, a landowner
subdivided his property in 1949 into three distinct lots, referred to as
A, B, and C and sold each to a different purchaser. The present
Violett v. King, 46 La. Ann. 78, 14 So. 423 (1894) (stable); Lombard v. Sewerage &
Water Board, 284 So. 2d 905 (La. 1973) (damages).
30. 290 So. 2d 821, 825 (La. 1974).
31. See CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 121, 128, 150, 152.
32. For detailed discussion, see Violations of Vicinage at 485.
33. Poole v. Guste, 261 La. 110, 262 So. 2d 339 (1972).
34. Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 805 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1972); see also New Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965) (injunction under Article 669). For exceptional decisions confusing the
requirements for injunctive relief under the old Code of Practice and under articles 667-
669 of the Civil Code, see Busby v. International Paper Co., 95 F. Supp. 596 (W.D.
La. 1951); Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934); Gibson
v. Baton Rouge, 161 La. 637. 109 So. 339 (1926).
35. 291 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1974).
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owners of the three lots are particular successors of the original ac-
quirers, namely, their vendees or transferees."5 As a result of the sub-
division and sale, lots B and C became enclosed; lot A was the only
one communicating with the public road. Since the time of the sale,
the owners of lots B and C have been using an unpaved driveway on
lot A for exit into the public road. Recently, the owner of lot B forbade
the owner of lot C to use the driveway on lot B for exit into the public
road through lot A. The owner of lot C then brought suit against the
owner of lot B, claiming a right of passage.
The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that it had no
authority to decree a legal servitude on A's property since he had not
been made a party to the proceedings. The court thought that it could
have decreed a passage through B's property, if B's property commu-
nicated with a public road; but B's property was also enclosed. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed and rendered judgment for
plaintiff based on article 701 of the Civil Code, with Judge Domen-
geaux dissenting. 7
Article 701 of the Civil Code declares:
[I]f the estate, for which the right of passage is claimed, has
become inclosed by means of sale, exchange or partition, the
vendor, coparcener or other owner of the land reserved, and upon
which the right of passage was before exercised, is bound to fur-
nish the purchaser or owner of the land inclosed with a passage
gratuitously, and even when it has not been sold or transferred
with the rights of servitude.
There is no corresponding provision in the 1804 Napoleonic Code.3
The direct source of article 701 is the text of Maleville 5 and it ex-
36. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3556(28).
37. 291 So. 2d 879, 885 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
38. See 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 701 (J. Dai-
now ed.). Article 684 of the Napoleonic Code, however, was amended by the Law of
August 20, 1881 to read: "If an estate is enclosed as a result of the division of a tract
of land by virtue of a sale, exchange, partition or any other contract, passage can only
be claimed over the lands forming the object of these acts. Nevertheless, when a
sufficient passage cannot be made over the lands thus divided, Article 682 shall
apply." For applications of this provision, see 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRArrE PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 940 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
39. See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, at 74
(1937): "Digest, book 12, tit. 6, law 22, sec. 1 Analyse Raisonnde de Maleville, vol. 2,
p. 130." Cf. 2 MALEVILLE, ANALYSE RAISONN9E DE LA DISCUSSION DU CODE CIVIL AU
CONSEIL D'ITAT 130 (1805): "Pour lors c'est au propridtaires des fonds reservds, et sur
lesquels s'exercait auparavant le passage, A le fournir A l'acqu6reur ou donataire, et
gratuitement, quand m~me le fonds n'aurait pas tA vendu ou donn6 avec ses droits
de servitude .... "
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presses well-settled French doctrine and jurisprudence. Thus, accord-
ing to Laurent:
When a tract of land is divided by an act of sale and a part of it
becomes enclosed, the part that has access to a public road is
burdened with a servitude of passage in favor of the enclosed
part. This is a logical consequence of the obligations of the seller
. . . . We must thus decide that there is a tacit agreement by
virtue of which the passage is due by one of the parties to the
other. This will always be a conventional rather, than legal pas-
sage .40
This excerpt supports the view expressed in the majority opinion.
If lots A, B, and C were still in the hands of the original purchasers,
there should be no doubt that plaintiff, owner of lot C, was entitled
to a gratuitous right of passage over lots B and A. But question arises
whether this obligation to grant a gratuitous passage has been trans-
mitted to the subsequent purchasers of lots B and A. In this respect,
Laurent has this to say:
May the second purchaser claim the passage to which his
ancestor in title was entitled? No, it has been said, because he
has purchased an enclosed estate. He does not have a right of
action by virture of the sale, but he has a right of action for a legal
servitude of passage. The Court of Cassation has ruled in this
sense. [Cass. April 24, 1867, D. 1867.1.227]. It seems to us that
the purchaser had an action against the author of his vendor. On
what is founded this action of the purchaser tending to obtain
passage? On the obligation of warranty contracted by the vendor.
Thus, in case of successive sales, the last purchaser may exercise
the action in warranty that belonged to his vendor. This is estab-
lished in the title of Sales. If one admits the principle, the ques-
tion is determined. The passage is a necessary accessory of the
tract of land; if the vendor has demanded and obtained it, it is
certain that, without any stipulation, it would have been trans-
mitted to the purchaser; thus, he has an action to claim the
passage, and one who has an action is considered to have the
thing itself. If the vendor transmits the passage to the purchaser,
he also transmits to him the action that tends to obtain the
passage."
It would seem, therefore, that the opinion of the majority is supported
40. 8 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS 110-11 (1876) (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 113.
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by application of the law of sales. Questions of liberative prescription
did not arise because the owner of lot C brought action as soon as the
right of passage was refused to him by the owner of lot B.
There remains the question whether the owner of lot A was an
indispensable party in the proceedings. If the demand were for a legal
servitude of passage under articles 699-700, the case should be re-
manded to the trial court, because without the owner of lot A as a
party in the proceedings, all the court "could grant is a passage to
the nearest neighbor which is not provided for in the aforementioned
articles." 4 But if the demand was actually for a recognition of a
conventional right of passage under article 701, the court could, and
should, grant the relief requested. The majority of the court, in spite
of contradictory statements by plaintiff, thought that the essence of
the demand was for the recognition of a conventional right of passage
that had existed since 1949.
CONVENTIONAL SERVITUDES
Contracting parties dealing with immovable property do not al-
ways carefully designate the kind of right they intend to establish.
Instead of using the proper name, they use descriptive terms. Thus,
quite frequently, the title creating a right of way servitude is silent
as to whether the servitude is personal or predial. The resolution of
this question is a matter of contractual interpretation and is governed
by both the general rules of construction of juridicial acts" and the
rules of construction applicable specifically to documents purporting
to create servitudes." In State, Department of Highways v. Cefalu, 5
the quantum of an expropriation indemnity depended on whether a
right of way servitude was personal or predial. Justice Calogero, rely-
ing on the language used by the parties as expressive of their intent,
on the purpose of the grant, and on the rule of interpretation estab-
lished in article 756 of the Civil Code, concluded that a predial servi-
tude had been created.
St. Julien Doctrine
In Harrison v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,4" an action for tres-
pass, plaintiff was successful in obtaining damages though not an
42. Patin v. Richard, 291 So. 2d 879, 886 (La. 1974) (Domengeaux, J., dissenting).
43. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1945-62.
44. Id. arts. 753-58. For detailed discussion, see Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes;
Creation by Title: Louisiana and Comparative Law, 45 TuL. L. REv. 459, 493 (1971).
45. 288 So. 2d 332 (La. 1974).
46. 288 So. 2d 37 (La. 1974).
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injunction for the removal of electrical poles encroaching on his prop-
erty. The lower court based its refusal to grant injunctive relief on the
St. Julien doctrine, an extra-statutory mode of servitudes of acquisi-
tion sanctioned by the Louisiana supreme court since at least 1883.11
According to this doctrine, a person who has "permitted the use and
occupancy of his land and the construction of a quasi-public work
thereon without resistance or even complaint . . . cannot afterwards
require its demolition, nor prevent its use, nor treat the company
erecting it as his tenant."48 In Harrison, the Louisiana supreme court
reversed, and rendered judgment enjoining defendant to remove the
poles. In a scholarly opinion, Justice Calogero indicated the basis and
socio-economic justification of the St. Julien doctrine, but refrained
from re-examining its validity. Under the version of the facts that the
court considered as established, there was no acquiescence by the
plaintiff landowner and St. Julien was clearly inapplicable. 9 Justice
Barham filed a powerful concurring opinion pointing out that the
Louisiana Civil Code "sets forth the only methods by which predial
servitudes may be acquired," and calling for the suppression of the
St. Julien doctrine which is an "inequitable, unlawful, and unconsti-
tutional method of expropriation of private property."50
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
The nature of building restrictions has been the topic of discus-
sion in Louisiana ever since Justice Provosty's celebrated opinion in
Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux.51 Early Louisiana decisions,
which have been rightly criticized," considered building restrictions
to be covenants running with the land. In recent years, however,
courts have consistently regarded building restrictions as real obliga-
tions and as rights likened to predial servitudes." Determination of
the nature of building restrictions is not merely a matter of academic
concern; it does carry significant practical consequences as illus-
trated in Fitzwater v. Walker.54 In this case, Judge Miller offered
perhaps the most workable formula yet. Referring to the "unique
47. See St. Julien v. Morgan L. & T.R. Co., 35 La. Ann. 924 (1883).
48. Id. at 925-26.
49. See also Koch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 298 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1974) (non-acquiescence).
50. 288 So. 2d at 41 (Barham, J., concurring).
51. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
52. See Comment, 33 TUL. L. Rgv. 822, 826 (1959).
53. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights: Limits of Contractual and Testamentary
Freedom, 30 LA. L. REv. 44, 61 (1969).
54. 281 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
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nature" of building restrictions, he declared that these are "sui ge-
neris real rights and should be governed by the general rules applica-
ble to predial servitudes subject to exceptions established by special
legislation or jurisprudence as to the creation, enforcement or termi-
nation of the restrictions."55
PERSONAL SERVITUDES: USUFRUCT
Testamentary donations of usufruct that impinge on the legitime
of forced heirs are not null on that account but reducible to the
disposable portion." In Succession of Hyde,57 discussed in a previous
issue of this Review,5" the Louisiana supreme court faced squarely the
question of when a bequest of usufruct impinges on the legitime of
forced heirs as well as the method of reduction of an excessive dona-
tion of usufruct. In this case, testator left the usufruct of his entire
property to the surviving spouse of a second marriage. Testator's
children, issues of a previous marriage, attacked the disposition on
the ground that it impinged on their legitime and demanded reduc-
tion of the donation by removing the usufruct from their forced
shares, and thereby limiting the bequest of usufruct to the disposable
portion.
In a scholarly and well-reasoned opinion, Justice Calogero re-
examined the basis of legitime in Louisiana and French law and
reached the conclusion that forced heirship "is a right to a fixed
portion of the estate in property,"59 namely in unencumbered owner-
ship. This means that the legitime may not be satisfied by disposi-
tions in usufruct or in naked ownership in favor of the forced shares,
no matter how valuable these rights may be. In all cases in which the
usufruct in favor of a legatee exceeds the quantum of the disposable
portion there is an excessive donation of usufruct that may be re-
duced, even though the value of the usufruct given does not exceed
the value of the disposable portion. The question of the valuation of
the usufruct and of the naked ownership is thus rendered moot in this
context.
Turning to the method of reduction, the court correctly deter-
mined that an excessive bequest in usufruct in favor of the spouse of
55. Id. at 792.
56. For detailed discussion, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 16 in 3
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (1968).
57. 292 So. 2d 693 (La. 1974). For discussion of the lower court decision, see The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term - Property, 34 LA. L.
REV. 207, 213 (1973).
58. 35 LA. L. REV. 205 (1974).
59. 292 So. 2d at 696.
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a second marriage, as in the case of any stranger, may be reduced at
the option of the forced heirs by application of article 1499 of the Civil
Code. Literally, forced heirs may exercise this option only in cases in
which the value of a bequest in usufruct exceeds the value of the
disposable portion; however, the decision of the supreme court in
Hyde gives the option to the forced heirs in all cases in which a
disposition in usufruct in favor of a legatee exceeds the quantum of
the disposable portion, that is, even if it does not exceed the value
of the disposable portion. Application of article 1499 will in most
cases produce results compatible with the intention of a testator who
wishes to bequeath to the surviving spouse of his last marriage the
maximum that the law allows. The bequest of the usufruct of the
entire estate may well be taken to establish that intention.
Technically, the Hyde decision deals with the reduction of an
excessive donation of usufruct in favor of a spouse of a second mar-
riage, but the same rule will apply to the reduction of a testamentary
disposition of usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse in community
that impinges on the legitime of issues of the marriage. Of course,
there will be no question of reduction in cases in which a testament
merely confirms the legal usufruct under article 916 of the Civil Code.
In Succession of Chauvin,60 which on account of its peculiar pro-
cedural posture is confined to its own facts," the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal declared, in effect, that a testamentary usufruct in favor
of the surviving spouse in community impinges on the legitime of an
issue of the marriage when it exceeds the quantum of the disposable
portion, even if it does not exceed the value of the disposable portion.
This accords fully with the conclusion reached by the Louisiana su-
preme court in Succession of Hyde.62 The court of appeal, however,
went on to reduce the excessive donation by removing the usufruct
from the forced share rather than granting to the forced heir the
option of article 1499 of the Civil Code. This determination does
violence to article 1499 and is clearly in conflict with the Hyde deci-
sion; therefore, it has no legal significance as a precedent.
REAL ACTIONS
Article 3653(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure declares that the
plaintiff in a petitory action must "make out" his title if the court
finds that the defendant is in possession of the property. A plaintiff
60. 286 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974). The Louisiana supreme court refused
writs, 293 So. 2d 166 (La. 1974), stating: "Under the peculiar procedural posture of
this case, the result is correct."
61. See Succession of Chauvin, 260 La. 828, 257 So. 2d 422 (1972).
62. See note 57 supra.
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makes out his title when he proves his ownership either by an unbro-
ken chain of valid transfers from the original owner or by acquisitive
prescription of ten or thirty years. In a sense, such a title is good
against the world.
While the text of article 3653(1) is clear and unambiguous, com-
ment (a) under this article has given rise to conflicting judicial deter-
minations. The comment states that the words "make out his title"
are taken from article 44 of the Code of Practice, and are intended to
have the same meaning as given to them under the jurisprudence
interpreting the source provision. Cases decided under the Code of
Practice consistently held that if the defendant in a petitory action
has possession without a title translative of ownership, the plaintiff
is not required to establish title good against the world but he merely
needs to establish a better title than that of the defendant. 3 Argu-
ment might thus be made that the redactors of the Code of Civil
Procedure intended to maintain this jurisprudence and to establish
an exception to the burden of proof under article 3653(1).
This argument is respectable and has some significant equitable
implications. There may be some merit to the idea that a person with
a defective title ought to prevail over a possessor who has no title at
all. The view has been expressed that if it were otherwise, a trespasser
without any semblance of title might be allowed to "take physical
possession of another's property, and should his possession endure for
more than a year before it is discovered, any break in the owner's
chain, however ancient, would defeat a petitory action to recover the
property. ' ' 4
However, such a horror is quite unlikely in real life. In the first
place, a possessory action may not prescribe in one year from the date
the trespasser took possession of the property but one year from the
date the owner acquired knowledge of the possession. 5 Secondly, a
break in the owner's chain does not prevent him from asserting own-
ership by acquisitive prescription of ten or thirty years. Literal ap-
63. See, e.g., Booksh v. New Iberia Sugar Co., 115 La. 516, 39 So. 545 (1905);
Kernan v. Baham, 45 La. Ann. 799, 13 So. 155 (1893); Peters v. Crawford, 185 So. 716
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). In J H. Jenkins Contractors, Inc. v. Farriel, 246 So. 2d 340,
343 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 261 La. 374, 259 So. 2d 882 (1972),
the court, following this jurisprudence declared that "a plaintiff who institutes a peti-
tory action against one who claims not by title, but by possession only, need not adduce
evidence disclosing a perfect title, but must exhibit some color of title."
64. Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 284 So. 2d 608, 614 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), reu'd,
294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974). See also 294 So. 2d at 799 (Summers, J., dissenting).
65. See Rathburn v. Barney, 29 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947); Ciaccio v.
Hartman, 170 La. 949, 129 So. 540 (1930); Pittman v. Bourg, 179 La. 66, 153 So. 22
(1934), cited in Babington Children Trusts v. Eimer, 285 So. 2d 792, 794 (La. 1973).
66. Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797, 799 (La. 1974): "Respondents, there-
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plication of article 3653(1) thus excludes recovery from an adverse
possessor only in cases in which the plaintiff is not the true owner.
As a matter of policy, this is not an objectionable result.
In Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner,7 a concursus proceeding, the court
held that a person out of possession claiming the ownership of im-
movable property adversely to a person in possession must "make
out" his title. The solution is fully supported by the idea that articles
3651-3653 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which contain new rules of
law and make important changes in the field of real actions, have
overruled all prior cases that contravene the new provisions. In adopt-
ing comment (a) under article 3653, the redactors were apparently
thinking of the mainstream of jurisprudence attributing meaning to
the words "make out his title" rather than of technical exceptions.
Besides, the comment is not a part of the text and cannot be taken
to establish exceptions when the text establishes none." If such an
exception were allowed to prevail in the light of the text of article
3653(1), which is clear and unambiguous, a chaotic situation might
arise. The burden of proof would no longer be allocated in the light
of the defendant's possession as article 3653 requires.
In Montgomery v. Breaux," the Louisiana supreme court held
that a petitory action may be defeated by a peremptory exception of
acquisitive prescription since the word "prescription" in article 927
of the Code of Civil Procedure includes both liberative and acquisi-
tive prescription. Justice Barham, writing for a unanimous court,
declared that the effect of a successful plea of acquisitive prescription
as a peremptory exception will be the dismissal of the petitory action;
the court may not render judgment recognizing defendant's owner-
ship of the immovable property. If the defendant in the petitory
action wishes to have a judgment declaring him owner of the immova-
ble property, he must plead acquisitive prescription in a reconven-
tional demand.
This broad interpretation of article 927 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure has merit, as it tends to speed up proceedings. A particular
defendant, if he so desires, may present his claim of acquisitive pre-
scription on an exception rather than at the trial of the petitory action
on the merits. In case of a successful plea of acquisitive prescription
as a peremptory exception, however, there will be a paradox: the
record owner will be forever out of possession, but the possessor will
fore, have not established either valid record title or prescriptive title to the property
in dispute."
67. 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974).
68. Desselle v. Bonnette, 251 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
69. 297 So. 2d 185 (La. 1974).
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not be owner. If the successful defendant wishes to be declared owner
of the property, he should bring an action for declaratory judgment.
In Ledoux v. Waterbury,0 a boundary action was defended on
the ground that the defendant had acquired the ownership of the
disputed strip of land by virtue of the ten year acquisitive prescrip-
tion of articles 3474 and 3478 of the Civil Code. Lower courts had held
that these articles were inapplicable to a boundary action. The Louis-
iana supreme court, relying on article 3693 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, declared that "title prescriptions may be pled in boundary
actions, and boundary prescriptions in title suits,"' and rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant. The decision strengthens the
institution of acquisitive prescription and does justice to the intent
of the redactors of the Code of Civil Procedure by suppressing the old
idea that petitory actions and boundary actions involve mutually
exclusive procedural forms.
In Babington Children Trusts v. Eimer," the Louisiana supreme
court made it clear the injunctive relief under article 3663(2) of the
Code of Civil Procedure is granted only to a person who had
possession for a full year preceding the disturbance. This requirement
will, for good reasons, exclude application of article 3663(2) in favor
of a predial lessee."3 A predial lessee, however, has an action for in-
junctive relief under article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4
70. 292 So. 2d 485 (La. 1974).
71. Id. at 487.
72. 285 So. 2d 792 (La. 1973).
73. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term -
Property, 33 LA. L. REv. 172, 197-98 (1973).
74. Caney Hunting Club, Inc. v. Tolbert, 294 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
In contrast with article 3601, injunctive relief under article 3663(2) is not predicated
on a showing of irreparable harm or even fear of future disturbance. Ward v. Standard
Materials, Inc., 293 So. 2d 885 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
